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an outstanding broadcaster, most obviously as presenter of the weekly programme on the BBC's World Service on 'People and Politics'. In public debate and Labour Party discussion he advocated the retention and reform of the House of Lords, recognizing the useful function it performed, and within the Lords he worked to develop the machinery for scrutinizing proposals coming from the European Commission. Throughout his career he was also an outstanding teacher of American government and British constitutional and political history. He retained his commitment as a teacher despite his excursions into public affairs. Consistent with his broader concerns, within the university he sought to widen opportunities for entry. He was delighted to have been elected by his colleagues as Master of Exeter College and as Master, and previously as Bursar, he actively and devotedly served his college.

For many senior civil servants Norman Hunt's part in preparing the first chapter to the Fulton report coloured their picture of him. Yet all who had any contact with him were struck by his infectious enthusiasm and good will. He worked energetically and tenaciously to advance the causes to which he was committed, but always in a generous and warmhearted spirit. His writing, broadcasting and the activity – whether on government committees, as minister or as member of the Lords – expressed his conviction that safeguarding and sustaining Britain's constitutional democracy could not be left to some impersonal process of evolutionary change but required active debate, energetic commitments to increasing opportunity and openness, and required also attending to how the machine of government is working in a practical way.

D. J. Murray

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## BRITISH FARCE, FRENCH DRAMA AND TALES OF TWO CITIES: REORGANIZATIONS OF PARIS AND LONDON GOVERNMENTS 1957-86

BRENDAN O'LEARY

Comparing the evidence of London and Paris reorganizations in the last three decades confirms that political interventions are often autonomous of administrative or class logic. Reorganizations are not mere registers of the subterranean workings of socio-economic forces. However, the reorganizations show that these political interventions are not autonomous from the characteristics of their respective political systems.

A *Tale of Two Cities* explores upheaval, honour, class, doctrine, intrigue, administrative politicking and symbolism in Paris and London in the 1790s. Dickens' novel ends in an execution. This essay explores similar themes in the reorganization and disorganization of Paris and London governments in the three decades 1957-1986. This 'faction' also comes to an end with an execution, albeit more comic than that of Sydney Carton, the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) on April 1st (All Fools Day) 1986.

Six modes of explaining institutional interventions by political élites, which are commonly used by political scientists, are explored here because they generate helpful insights which facilitate the understanding of recent transformations of Paris and London governments. The six modes of explanation treat reorganizations as the outcomes of:

- managerial rationality
- class struggle
- political ideologies
- party political competition
- bureaucratic politics
- symbolic politics.

These modes of explanation are not necessarily incompatible with one another

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but each has its own distinct emphasis. The six modes of explanation are used to establish the salient similarities and contrasts between the reorganizations of Paris and London.

Two general points are confirmed about the reorganizations of London and Paris between 1957 and 1986. First, the reorganizations of both city-regions illustrate the general autonomy of politics from other social processes, and the particular autonomy of the politics of capital cities which are also full-scale metropolises. Second, the contrasts between London and Paris reorganizations serve to support Ashford's oxymoronic thesis of 'British dogmatism and French pragmatism', but only if we qualify his thesis by reference to 'British farce and French drama' (Ashford 1982).

Paris and London, the two largest city-regions of unitary states with similar populations, have dominated their respective economic and cultural provinces for several centuries. They have been distinguished in their respective political systems by the uniqueness of their governmental and administrative arrangements. For instance, London government was excluded from the first Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. Moreover, the London County Council, set up in 1889, and the Metropolitan Borough Councils, set up in 1899, created a two-tier structure for London, which made the capital the only city in England and Wales not organized on a single tier basis. London government was reorganized during 1963-5 in isolation from the rest of the British local government system, and its two-tier metropolitan system differed considerably from the six established elsewhere in England and Wales in 1974. Finally, London government has been *disorganized* differently from the other metropolitan governments of England during 1983-86. Paris has also been treated differently from other French cities. The territorial boundaries of the Ville de Paris were fixed by Napoleon III and have remained intact since. Paris was excluded from Waldeck-Rousseau's democratization of commune administration in France in 1884. The Paris region and the Ville de Paris were also singled out for special treatment in the course of French local government reorganizations from 1961 to 1986. But here we are concerned to isolate the factors which serve to explain the reorganizations of Paris and London governments during the last three decades.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALITY: RESPONDING TO FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVES?

The first mode of explaining institutional reorganizations, found especially among public administrators, is to account for change as the outcome of projects of managerial reform. Reformers, motivated by disinterested administrative considerations, succeed when they can overcome petty, parochial and traditionalist resistance to necessary change. Most local government reorganizations in liberal democracies are justified in these discourses of administrative rationality. The concepts of 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', and 'economy' normally dominate the rhetoric of reorganization. The creation of the GLC and the London boroughs in 1963, the abolition of the GLC in 1986, the establishment of the *District de la Région*

*Parisienne* in 1961, the setting up of the *Région Parisienne* and the restructuring of departments between 1964 and 1966, and the fabrication of the *Ile-de-France* in 1976, fulfil these expectations. These reorganizations were all officially justified in managerial language. 'Modernization', 'growth', 'planning' and 'institutional reform' were the 'buzz words' of Conservative and Labour élites in the 1960s, and they remained in vogue until the mid 1970s. The wholesale reorganization of local government in England and Wales in 1974 took place under their auspices. In France the Gaullist regime's obsession with administrative co-ordination and efficiency 'explains', in one author's view, the major restructuring of the Paris region, as well as the creation of super-ministries, the founding of new ministries, and internal reform of ministries (Wright 1984, p. 107).

The urgent 'need' for a reorganization of London government had been proclaimed by planners and academic public administrators since the First World War (Abercrombie 1944; Robson 1949; Smallwood 1965; Rhodes 1970). A strategic planning authority was believed necessary for the London region, one which would have the functional capacity to respond to the housing, education, transport and environmental imperatives of the modern metropolis. London's nineteenth century institutions - a motley assortment of about 100 units of varying authority but including the powerful Labour-controlled London County Council (LCC) - were widely considered ill-adapted for the functional imperatives of urban and suburban sprawl. In 1957 the Conservative government set up a Royal Commission to investigate these contentions, the Herbert Commission. Reporting in 1960, the commission recommended that London government be rebuilt from scratch. Rationality, economies of scale and a trade-off between size and accessibility dictated a two-tier system of government for the metropolis. A Greater London Council, directly elected, with strategic planning functions for housing, education, transport, fire, waste-disposal and the environment would form the higher tier. The lower tier would be made up of rationalized, that is larger and more equally resourced, boroughs. The argument was frequently advanced that many local authorities had become too small for the services they were required to administer (Stacey 1975, p. 112).

But by 1983 another Conservative government, containing members who had supported the reforms of 1963-5, was pledged to abolish the GLC in its manifesto, and in an infamous White Paper, *Streamlining the Cities*, rested its case on considerations of managerial efficiency (O'Leary 1987). The GLC, along with other metropolitan governments, was asserted to be administratively redundant, superfluous, role-less, unloved, but unfortunately imperious. The 1960s 'fashion' for strategic planning was derided by the Government, and functional imperatives were judged to dictate the 'return' to the boroughs of powers which they had in fact never had, and the replacement of the elected council and its administration by *ad hoc* agencies and joint boards. So the birth of the GLC was justified by the managerial discourse of the growth era while its death sentence was served in the managerial discourse of the era of retrenchment. London reorganizations have culminated in the abolition of a three-tiered structure of elected government (the boroughs, GLC and central government) and its replacement by two elected tiers

(the boroughs and central government) and a fragmentation of metropolitan government.

The processes of urbanization, population growth and demographic shifts were more rapid and profound in the post-war Paris region and France than in post-war London and the UK (Wright 1984). The environmental pressures affecting local administration were therefore more intense in Paris than London. As a result of these pressures the historically established relationships between administrative territory and public functions in French local government were frequently proclaimed to be managerially meaningless by French academics and political commentators (Gourevitch 1980, 1981). French public administration, modelled on the classical Jacobin imagery of a unified and indivisible pyramid, was considered spoiled by the reality of increasingly dysfunctional and overlapping jurisdictions. As in Britain, public administration enthusiasts vied with one another to provide optimal solutions to these perceived irrationalities. The remedies on offer included merging or dissolving communes and departments, regional planning, regionalism, weakening or strengthening the prefect, and harmonizing administrative jurisdictions. The creation of a planning commissariat for Paris in 1952 (Ridley and Blondel 1969, p. 119) and the establishment of the *District de la Région Parisienne* in 1961, both instruments of the central government, were justified as necessary to co-ordinate development and land-use planning, and regional services (transport). Debré, the first Prime Minister of the Fifth Republic, determined to put an end to the 'anarchy' of fragmented decision-making in Paris. In the eyes of planners, Paris had paid the price of nearly a century of neglect of town planning which had produced a sprawling wilderness of pre-war suburbs ill-equipped with public services: 'a vast, ill-conceived, hastily constructed emergency camp to house the labour force of Paris... presenting almost the limit of urban degeneration' (P. Hall 1984, p. 62).

Indeed the majority of the institutional transformations which were implemented in the Paris region in the course of the Fifth Republic, in particular those which were inaugurated at the beginning of the 1960s, were initiated in the name of urban planning' (Dagnaud 1979, p. 145). For instance, the second report of the First Maspétiol Commission of 1960, which recommended a metropolitan Greater Paris Council and new, uniform municipalities, was somewhat similar in its thinking to the Herbert Commission. But, unlike the Herbert Commission's recommendations, the Maspétiol report was not followed, even in broad outlines. The 1964-66 reforms established a *Région Parisienne*, a new departmental structure for the Paris region, and gave the old city of Paris double status as a commune and department. The administrative rationale for these reforms was to facilitate planning the regional infrastructure.

The 1975-77 reorganizations which renamed the region as *Ile-de-France*, created a new regional council and gave Paris an elected mayor, were also publicly justified by managerial logic: the creation of administrative uniformity by the removal of anomalies. Paris government was to be made more like the rest of French local government. Similarly, administrative decentralization and accessibility provided the justifications when *arrondissement* mayors were made directly elected officials

in 1982, and the Paris region was made directly elected during 1982-86. By contrast with London, Paris reorganizations have progressed consistently along two directions: the addition of more tiers and the extension of democracy at each tier. Paris reorganizations have culminated in a four-tier structure of elected government, both in the city and the region. In the *Ville de Paris* there exist four tiers - the *arrondissement*, *commune-département*, *région* and central government; whereas in the suburbs and hinterland the four tiers are different - *commune*, *département*, *région* and central government. At first glance, it also seems plausible to suggest that Parisian reorganizations have involved a better functional adaptation to administrative overload and the management of regional interdependencies, but more detailed public policy evaluation is required to confirm this suggestion. [The London-Paris Group, based on the Greater London Group of academics and researchers at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the *Groupe ment de Recherche coordonnées sur L'Administration Locale*, based at University of Paris 1, is currently undertaking such work.]

All these reorganizations of Paris and London share the fact that they were justified administratively, managerially or technocratically, although the weight of such rhetoric was much stronger in the 1960s than the 1970s, and although the managerial fashions varied considerably. Moreover, much of the rhetoric of reorganizations was common elsewhere in Western Europe and North America during the 1960s - when enthusiasm for metropolitan political systems was at its height. But, we must ask, how genuinely important were environmental pressures and administrative rationality in explaining the reorganizations? Is it true that 'In the final analysis it was economic and social pressure, not political will that produced reorganization' (Ashford 1982, p. 97)? Several considerations should give us pause. It is plain that even if environmental pressures suggested the need for reorganization, the pressures were neither single-peaked nor overwhelming.

First, such pressures did not point unequivocally to 'one best way' as a solution: for example, various permutations of central, regional, metropolitan and local solutions were cogently canvassed for both Paris and London in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, the initial reorganizations were long 'overdue' in both cases. Neither London nor Paris government had been altered substantially since the nineteenth century, and the problems of urbanization and suburbanization, while long apparent, had been dealt with by many *non-decisions* over the organizations of both capitals. No less than 23 proposals were made for the reorganization of Paris during the Third and Fourth Republics (Ashford 1982, p. 97), and on Pezant's (1976, p. 8) reckoning nearly 100 parliamentary bills unsuccessfully addressed the subject from 1871 to 1973. Article 89 of the constitution of the Fourth Republic, which promised to 'extend departmental and communal liberties', and made feasible the reorganization of Paris and other big city governments, was never implemented. The 'battle for the reform' of London had been equally long and frustrating and included a fruitless Royal Commission in the 1920s (Rhodes 1970). Third, as there was no single administrative logic, but rather many logics, political élites had the opportunity to determine which logic they preferred. Fourth, the 'implementation deficit' between the rationalist proclamations surrounding reorganizations and what

actually occurred was often considerable. In the case of London, the Herbert Commission's proposals were substantially altered in the course of Cabinet and Parliamentary processing, and left the GLC with a 'flawed design' which hand-capped it from its inception (Flynn et al. 1985, p. 32). In the case of Paris, the 'technocratic utopia' of the Maspétiol Commission proposals of 1959, 1960, and 1961 significantly diverged from what was implemented *de jure* between 1961 and 1964, largely as a result of resistance by political *notables* (Daugnaud 1979, p. 148).

To accept the importance of administrative rationality in explaining reorganizations normally commits the analyst to portraying the reorganizers as a unified group with well-specified managerial objectives. But, as Wright (1974, p. 50) suggests for France, the Fifth Republic has had no consistent theory of administration. '... here has in fact, been a total lack of system, largely as a result of the contradictions within the minds of the reformers and of the need to reach compromises between the opposing factions involved in drafting the reforms.' With greater party alteration, and no functional equivalent of a Presidency, British government has had even less chance to have a consistent theory of administration, and has certainly not displayed one administrative logic in its central departmental reorganizations (Pollitt 1984) or its local government reorganizations – especially when one compares the very different systems installed in Scotland and Northern Ireland, with those built in England and Wales. Finally, in some reorganizations the substantive importance of administrative rationality is negligible: it is mere rhetoric. The rational case for the abolition of the GLC was made in a threadbare manner and after the decision to abolish had already been made (O'Leary 1985a, 1987). Indeed, the analyses and reports produced by the Conservative government (the White Paper, *Streamlining the Cities*, October 1983, and the Yellow Paper, June 1984) confirm the cynical suggestion that rationalist managerial rhetoric is intended to reassure observers of the appropriateness of the actions being taken rather than to influence the actions themselves (Feldman and March 1981).

In conclusion, while it is inappropriate to discount administrative rationality entirely when explaining reorganizations (Daugnaud 1979, p. 145; O'Leary 1985b), it is plausible to suggest that its importance was greater in both Paris and London in the 1960s, the false dawn of technocracy, than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. However, even in the 1960s, reorganization was, as we shall see, determined more by class, ideological, political and symbolic actions and interests. It was never solely the outcome of managerial projects.

It is not difficult to detect similarities in administrative rhetorics in Paris and London reorganizations and have similar reasons for being sceptical about their significance. There is however one major contrast. Successful Parisian reorganization has been more incremental, cumulative, and even consensual in conception and execution than that in London, which by comparison has been more heroic, cyclical and adversarial. This contrast is partly accounted for by France's more directly politicized central–local relations in which the *cummi des mandats* and informal decentralization of political authority creates an élite of politicians with firmly entrenched interests in central–local relations (Grémion 1976; Crozier and Thoenig 1976). The defeat of the more heroic, maximalist and comprehensive of

the Gaullist projects for local reorganization in Paris (the ordinance of 1959, the Maspétiol Commission and the Referendum of 1969) shows the significance of these forces which successfully resisted the impetus for administrative transformations. It also appears, contrary to the usual clichés, that British policy-making in the area of local government design has been more ideological and hyper-rationalist in its aspirations.

#### THE REGULATION OF CLASS CONFLICT IN THE CAPITAL?

When analysing institutional transformations in cities Marxists and urban political sociologists look to the class interests at stake. They regard reorganizations as by-products of class struggle or as strategies in such struggles. It is well known that the physical and administrative development of Paris was shaped by the terror which the revolutions of 1789 and 1830, the Red Days of 1848, and the *commune* of 1871 had inspired among the French bourgeoisie. The exceptional political treatment of Paris stemmed not only from the standard desires of élites engaged in state-building to control their capital cities, but from the well-founded fear that the Parisian proletariat was capable of staging a *coup d'état* in the capital. The presence of a 'red belt' in the Parisian suburbs, a bastion of the French Communist Party from the 1930s, served as a permanent reminder of latent class war in the city. The central government's monopoly of the Paris police is partly explained by bourgeois fear. Some of the same fear lay behind the reluctance to fuse old Paris with the hundreds of suburban communes. The reorganization of the Parisian region departments 1964–66, which entailed the abolition of the left-dominated *Seine département*, and the urban policy responses to the events of 1968, have also been interpreted as modern versions of the French bourgeoisie's *grande peur* of the Paris proletariat.

However, as historians have pointed out, the changes in the class composition of Paris proper, consequent upon Haussmann's rebuilding programme in the Second Empire, had found political expression as long ago as 1900 and 1902, when the right gained control of the Paris municipal council (Cobban 1965, p. 44). Those elections, according to Cobban who was writing before 1968, marked 'the end of the *bras nus* and the barricades'. The consequence for post-war French urban planning, especially after Gaullist interventions in the 1960s, was the completion of the *embourgeoisement* of old Paris. The *embourgeoisement* was such that by 1974 Giscard d'Estaing could freely contemplate allowing the capital its first mayor since 1870 (Hayward 1983, p. 41). Reconstruction, renovation and urban planning built the left out of Paris much more successfully than the ICC, under Herbert Morrison, managed to achieve its goal of building the Tories out of London. The changing class structure of the cultural and administrative core of the old city helps explain why a government of the right could embark upon the democratization of Paris local government in the 1970s. Nonetheless, although a changed balance of class forces may have been a necessary precondition of a more relaxed outlook towards Parisian democracy on the part of the French right, it does not wholly account for Parisian reorganizations. Contrary to Daugnaud's (1979)

preamble to her otherwise informative article, it is implausible to suggest that *all* Parisian institutional reforms were caused by class struggle. The ideological party-political and dramatic interests of the élites who reorganized Paris in the 1960s and 1970s were not reducible to the strategic interests of capital, as we shall see, and workers' struggles over local government forms are difficult to detect.

The organization and reorganization of London government since the 1890s is also helpfully understood as underwritten by class tensions (Young 1975). The Conservative-Liberal Unionist refurbishing of London government in the 1880s left the rich City of London unreformed and the LCC was definitely not intended, by boundary design or functions, to become a bastion of progressive causes. However, the Conservatives' competence in pursuit of their imputed class interests was debatable. In contrast to the French, the British Conservatives managed to spawn what they regarded as an electoral Frankenstein in their capital city, albeit one of Fabian rather than Communist temperament. They soon contemplated abolition of the newly established LCC because Progressives won early electoral successes. It is also true that under Salisbury's leadership the Conservatives made sure that the London police remained under the Home Office. In 1899 they also established stronger boroughs to act as a counterweight to the LCC. Fear of the working class 'mob', as in Paris, was a dominant theme in early London Conservatism. However, such anxiety waned in the course of this century until the riots of 1981 reinvigorated it with a vengeance.

But the important contrast is this: in the twentieth century the London proletariat remained comparatively concentrated in the old city core, whereas the core city of Paris is overwhelmingly bourgeois (Hall 1984). Partly as a result the LCC was a reformist Labour bastion from 1934 to 1965 and continuously threatened the class interests represented in suburbia and some rich pockets in central London (especially Westminster and the City of London). The break-up of the LCC and the creation of the GLC was understandably interpreted by the London Labour movement as a class manoeuvre by the Conservatives in which the radical inner city was to be swamped by conservative suburbia (Smallwood 1965). However, here again, if the Conservatives were mainly engaged in a class-based strategy they botched their attack on the class enemy. The GLC boundaries were drawn more narrowly than the Herbert Commission had suggested (Smallwood 1965) and London's working class core in the inner city remained sufficient to help Labour to electoral victories in 1965, 1973 and 1981. Consequently the Labour party never felt sufficiently hard done by to restore the LCC during its long tenure of central government (1964-70 and 1974-79). However, the weakness of the GLC, which in comparison to the LCC was functionally under-equipped and more geographically dispersed, allowed the suburbs to subvert and destroy its potentially redistributive housing, planning and transport functions in turn (Young and Kramer 1978; Hall 1984, p. 53; Hart 1984). By 1983 the GLC had been effectively crushed as an instrument of redistribution by bourgeois suburbia even before the Thatcher administration decided to put an end to it.

There is a class-based explanation for some of these facts. The Conservatives were faced with a fundamental conflict within their social base. Middle class

suburbanites have generally resisted electoral integration with the old core city, yet their electoral integration is essential to buttress the bourgeoisie and to weaken proletarian dominance of the inner city. This pattern of conflict *within* the middle class helps account for many of the tensions in city government in Western Europe and North America (Ashton 1984). Class interests in cities are not monolithic, nor are they dichotomous. These facts create latitude for politicians to develop strategies and interventions which are therefore not reducible to some imputed homogeneous class interest. Indeed it is possible to argue that it is the very complexity of class interests in the metropolis which creates the opportunity for politicians to act autonomously in reorganizing city boundaries.

Neither in London nor in Paris should one make a fetish of the politics of 'place and space' as some authors do (Young 1984). Places and spaces are inanimate objects which cannot have opposing interests, and we can often decode spatial conflicts as class conflicts. But, as in the Paris case, recent London reorganizations are emphatically not reducible to the interests of capital. Moreover, bourgeois class interests were not *originally* represented in London reorganizations, even when one takes into account the tensions between the suburban middle class and the middle class of the city core. Not only were the GLC boundaries badly drawn in 1965 if their purpose was to weaken Labour, but also the newly created inner London boroughs created Labour strongholds. The current reorganization of the GLC's functions is also not being executed by the Conservatives in a manner obviously consistent with dominant bourgeois interests. For example, the suburban bourgeoisie and employees of multinational and financial capitalist organizations have an interest in heavily subsidized public transport, but the government is committed to its gradual demise. In fact the historical evidence suggests that it has been parochial and petit bourgeois class influences, rather than the strategic metropolitan-wide class interests of the bourgeoisie, which have regularly prevailed in London reorganizations in the 1890s, 1963-5 and 1983-86. [Again there is an interesting contrast with Paris: Gaullist urban planning was much less sensitive to local class influences and only under Giscard did the class interests of the petit bourgeoisie make themselves felt under the banner of environmentalism (Townshend 1984, p. 462).] Finally, in recent years Labour's support in London has been changing character as well as suffering a considerable reduction (Gyford 1985). Inner city ethnic minorities and public administration employees have become significant components of what is no longer a clearly class-based movement. The 'local socialism' of the Livingstone administration, which so much outraged traditional Conservatives, was not working class in its rhetoric or substance. Similarly, the Conservative attack on the GLC was more of an attack on the extended state, of over-expanded public administration, than an assault upon a working class institution. It was an attack on the Labour party more than it was an attack on Labour.

#### IDEOLOGIES OF STATE AND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT?

Politicians are often portrayed as being bewitched by *idéés fixes*. Far from being unprincipled they are dogmatically principled. How else can one explain their

frequent recourse to actions which seem to be against their more pragmatic interests? French and British political élites have often proclaimed philosophies, programmes and strategies for the local government of the capital consistent with their overall ideological orientations. How important have such ideologies been in London and Paris reforms or 'deforms'?

Gaullism notoriously stood for *'une certaine idée de la France'*. When de Gaulle was President, Gaullism appeared as corporatist ideology and practice: a state guiding an economy to ensure unity, order, efficiency and the 'national interest' (Winkler 1976). Corporatism, according to Winkler, is implemented through flexible, relatively informal and non-bureaucratic organizations. Early Gaullist attempts to restructure local government proclaimed the principles of unity, order, efficiency and the national interest. The Gaullists were also generally reluctant to formalize democratic opposition and dissent. They feared such practices would give a cue to the old 'corrupt' party system and give old doctrinal quarrels an opportunity to re-assert themselves against the new technocracy through which the certain idea of France was to be realized (Ardagh 1977, p. 274). Gaullism in practice amounted to an amalgam of corporatism and Jacobinism. Gaullist ideology was interpreted to develop a corresponding *'certainne idée de la Paris'*. The plans to halt the growth of Paris, which had been formulated in the 1950s, were reversed by Delouvrier, the former prefect of Algiers whom de Gaulle made director of the *District de la Région Parisienne* with quasi-ministerial status. The 1965 *Schema Directeur* which envisaged an expansion of Paris, making it a metropolis of advanced motorways, metros and airports, was a Gaullist blueprint for modernization. The Gaullist planners objected vehemently to existing political and administrative constraints which they claimed blocked the *Schema Directeur* and justified their reorganization of the departments of the Paris region. What amounted to an informal ministry for Paris by-passed the non-Gaullist parties and the formal local administration, and freed the Gaullists to refashion Paris in the image they desired. In that image, as signalled by Malraux, Paris was to become the leading city of Europe. The Gaullist treatment of Paris certainly matched their ideology, but, as we shall see, it does not wholly explain their institutional reorganizations. The ideologies espoused by French Presidents and majorities after de Gaulle have been less forceful, but have also had an impact on Parisian administration. Pompidou's tenure of the Presidency marked Gaullism's transition from an architectonic movement to a more traditional conservative party. Delouvrier had been sacrificed in 1969, and Paris was left free for developers unconstrained by a certain idea of France. But, from 1972 Pompidou turned his attention to the evidence of urban protest against the Gaullist modernization of Paris and set up the Taittinger Commission to calm discontent. Giscard d'Estaing, in the interests of building a Presidential coalition, espoused environmentalism as a component of his ideology of 'advanced liberalism', and used the consequences of Gaullist development to make a case for a mayor for Paris, and promised intervention in the built environment. Similarly, the Socialists under Mitterrand had become the party of decentralization and *auto-gestionnaire*, and had developed an ideology of local government which justified their interventions in the Paris area between 1982 and 1985: direct

elections for *arrondissement* mayors and an elected Paris region freed from prefectural tutelage.

The Conservatives have never displayed the same pride in their capital as the Gaullists have for theirs. The old Tories' idea of England' remains essentially rooted in rural arcadias and green suburbs in the Home Counties inhabited by former tea-planters. Consequently their ideological perspectives on their capital have been more prosaic. The Conservatives justified their first twentieth-century reorganization of London through the nostrums of classical organization theory, and talk of 'improving democracy', both of which had been articulated by the Herbert Commission. Reorganization was supported by the obvious tenets of classical administrative wisdom: the emphasis was upon improving public bureaucracy through greater professionalization, functional demarcation and the removal of overlapping jurisdictions. The two-tier structure was also supposed to present the London voter with a more intelligible and accessible system of local government. However, the ideology of classical organization theory and representative government was not exclusively Conservative, but was all-pervasive in the reorganizations of local government proposed by Labour and Conservative governments in the 1960s and 1970s, the era of consensus.

The Thatcher administration has been distinct from that of recent Conservative governments, and has drawn upon two components of neo-liberal ideology in its attitude towards local government: public choice and monetarism. Apart from monetarism, the Government has had no faith in any form of planning, economic or urban. The public choice approach to local government emphasizes the merits of privatization, performance indicators, contracting-out, and bureaucratic competition. It has been echoed in local Conservative policy-making in the London boroughs. However, there are good reasons for being sceptical about how well the reorganization of London government matches public choice prescriptions (O'Leary 1987; Hood, Huby and Dunsire 1987). It is true that the Treasury, especially under chief secretary Leon Britan, interpreted monetarism to require central government control over local taxation and expenditure levels. From 1981 the Labour-controlled GLC was the most conspicuous source of opposition to the Government's offensive against public expenditure, and it is possible to understand the abolition of the GLC as an ideological by-product of the pursuit of monetarism. If so, monetarism was not understood properly (Boddy 1984, p. 227; Jones and Stewart 1983, p. 11). Furthermore, GLC expenditure could have been controlled without abolition. Consequently if the Conservatives acted to implement their positively held ideological beliefs when abolishing the GLC, the decision was neither rationally warranted nor executed appropriately (O'Leary 1987, p. 204-208).

The Thatcher administration vehemently displays two other negative ideological traits which cast light on its decision to abolish the GLC. First, an antipathy to socialism more deeply felt than in the era of Keynesian consensus. And second, a profound distaste for bargaining with interest groups, compromise and the concerns of 'low politics'. The first trait was openly displayed by Norman Tebbit, chairman of the Conservative Party, who declared in March 1984 that 'The GLC is typical of this new, modern, divisive version of socialism. It must be defeated.

So we shall abolish the GLC.' The second trait, according to one academic, marks the return of traditional Conservative conceptions of statecraft (Bulpitt 1983). Conservatives have traditionally preferred a dual polity which separates 'high' and 'low' politics, and leaves the centre free to manage the high politics of empire and sound finance. The drives to depoliticize local government, to break existing liberal corporatist networks in central-local relations, and to strengthen the citizen against local bureaucracy can thus be represented as a fusion of traditional Conservative statecraft and neo-liberal ideology. Abolition of the GLC was apparently consistent with both of these positive and negative ideological traits. Whether they were the motive force of abolition is more debatable. Moreover in practice Conservative statecraft has resulted in an unparalleled legal, administrative and political centralization of the UK. Far from 'freeing the centre', the Thatcher administration has centralized decision-making and absorbed low politics into the domain of the centre – and almost certainly overloaded the Departments of the Environment and Education. The fervent neo-liberals hope that centralization will be a stepping-stone to extensive privatization, but to date the reorganization of London government has yet to match their aspirations.

Gaullism and Thatcherism enveloped the reorganization of Paris in the 1960s and London in the 1980s in ideological garb. Mobilizing parties of the right carried out major restructurings of both capitals as part of self-proclaimed campaigns dedicated to building a new France or new 'Great Britain, with rejuvenated nations radically overhauled after decades of spineless and indecisive government. Whatever survived from the respective old regimes was tainted by association, and liable to attack if for no other reason. But compared to Thatcherism, Gaullism's rhetoric was louder than its organizational bite. The Gaullists more often preferred to bypass their enemies rather than destroy them in their bases. Twice in three decades the Conservatives have taken on the Labour party in full frontal assaults over London government. By contrast Giscard and Mitterrand's alterations of Paris have been institutionally and ideologically prosaic. Labour made no ideologically-charged reorganization of London during 1964–70 (the addition of transport to the GLC's functions in 1968 was an entirely managerial action) or during 1970–74. Nor did they display the Conservatives' penchant for party manoeuvre in local reorganizations.

The various reorganizations are therefore partly explicable as by-products of ideological thinking but this facet must be qualified by a very important consideration. Party interests in a system of liberal democratic competition, and the enthusiasm of political élites for political theatre often explain the decisions to reorganize local government better than principle beliefs. Ideology legitimates decisions taken for other reasons.

#### POLITICAL COMPETITION AND GAMESMANSHIP?

The administrative reorganizations of a capital city do not usually provoke great excitement among its general citizenry. If politics is boring, local politics bores absolutely. The abolition of the GLC was quite exceptional in that it produced much

greater public mobilization than, for example, that of the abolition of the LCC – which was overwhelmingly a parliamentary, bureaucratic and pressure group affair. And even the mobilization against GLC abolition was marshalled from above by the Livingstone administration's astute use of modern advertising media. The reasons for the public's general lack of interest in the reorganization of local government are not difficult to understand. The consequences of reorganizations are more remote and unpredictable to citizens than they are for politicians and those employed in public administration. Reorganizations matter most to the political class.

Politicians may be buffeted by environmental pressures which suggest the need for rationalization, they may be swayed by class interests, and they may be moved by their own ideologies, but if reorganizations do not offer them party or symbolic advantage, and fairly quickly, they are reluctant to engage in institutional reform. Perceptions of party advantage have been very salient in both Paris and London reorganizations.

In 1958 the Gaullists were a movement rather than a party. The ordinance of 1959, including Article 5 which gave complete authority to the Government for five years to carry out any desired institutional changes in the Paris region, was seen as a blatant assault on the old parties. As the Gaullists' dominance was only being established between 1958 and 1962 it is not surprising that they had to withdraw their opening gambit. They were defeated by entrenched local politicians and the Senate. However, after their Algerian and electoral triumphs they were free to sabotage the old parties as well as engage in party-building. The abolition of the Seine department in the mid 1960s was an assault on the parties of the Left, and Gaullist management of the region helped cement the Gaullists as the dominant party of the right in Paris. Giscard d'Estaing's Presidential bid in 1974 included proposals for the reform of Paris because it seemed the best way of outflanking the Gaullists in one of their electoral strongholds, and building up the claims of his own party, especially as the Gaullists were in temporary disarray with a whiff of scandal in the air. Giscard was so successful that he defeated Chaban-Delmas, the official Gaullist Presidential candidate, in the Paris area in the first round of the Presidential contest of 1974. But Giscard's attempt at party-building in the Paris region eventually backfired spectacularly, so that not only did Jacques Chirac, the born-again Gaullist, defeat the President's own candidate for the mayoralty of Paris, but also a major rift was opened on the French right which contributed to Giscard's defeat in the Presidential elections of 1981.

The politics of the Paris mayoralty illustrate the party-political nature of reorganizations perfectly. Giscard's attempted dilution of the proposed powers of the mayor in the Paris statute after Chirac had won the mayoralty election revealed not only a taste for vengeance but contradicted his declared reasons for wanting a Parisian mayor in the first place! (Townshend 1984). Chirac successfully waged a legal battle with the President in the *Conseil d'État* so Giscard's attempts to damage the Gaullists in Paris twice went down to defeat. The Socialists were also to suffer setbacks when they tried to attack the Gaullists' Paris bastion between 1981 and 1986. The Socialists' municipal decentralization proposals, which gave



elected mayors to the Parisian *arrondissements*, were understandably seen as attempts to disrupt Chirac from below, while the inclusion of Paris in the regional reforms with a new electoral system also promised to weaken the Paris City Gaullists, this time from above. As it happened, the Gaullists achieved a clean sweep of the *Ville de Paris* in 1983, and the regional elections of 1986, while boosting Socialist representation, resulted in the National Front holding the balance of power.

Therefore proposed and actual changes in boundaries, in election systems and the number of elected and administrative tiers for the Paris city-region can be seen as 'straightforward' manoeuvres for advantage by the major party élites. In these manoeuvres the Gaullists have done best, while their opponents' attempts to unseat them since 1974, despite their advantage of Presidential incumbency, have so far frequently proved counter-productive.

The hegemonic party of the Right has also, at first glance, worsened its opponents in London reorganizations. According to Young there has been a continuous Conservative 'strategy for London' built around fears of a powerful, unitary, redistributive, socialist-run and London-wide authority (Young 1975). Conservatives have preferred a narrow definition of London, a weak upper tier authority if there has to be an upper tier authority, but their maximalist objective has always been the fragmentation of London government. By contrast Gaullists, confident of their political dominance of inner Paris, have always contested the 'balkanization' of Paris which the Giscardians and Socialists are accused of plotting. Whether London Conservatives have had the continuous planned strategy suggested by Young is debatable, but party advantage has been far more dominant in the strategy, when it has existed, than ideological conceptions of what does or does not constitute the London community.

Brooke, the Conservative Minister for Housing and Local Government who initiated the execution of the LCC in 1956, had been the leader of the Conservative opposition in the LCC and was widely suspected of a deliberate party manoeuvre when he embarked upon the reform process. However, as we have seen, the Conservative execution of the LCC was imperfect. Outer London Conservative authorities successfully lobbied to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the GLC and thus unwittingly helped give Labour victory in the first GLC elections in 1965. The execution of the GLC (1983-86) was also rightly seen as an assault on the Labour party. The Conservatives' strength in the borough elections of 1982 and an imminent general election victory in 1983 left the Labour-controlled GLC sandwiched between two tiers of rampant Conservatives in a period which was widely acknowledged to mark the greatest polarization between the two parties since the 1930s. However, the party advantages of GLC abolition for the Conservatives were questionable. Electoral analysts are agreed that other things being equal, Labour would in any case have lost control of the GLC in the council elections due for 1985. The Government's planning was not marvellous from their own party's perspective: their original proposals for the reorganization of London would actually have over-represented Labour on the proposed joint boards (Gent 1984j). And the *cause célèbre* dealt to the London Labour party by proposing the cancellation of elections before abolition achieved the unlikely feats of making 'local socialism'

briefly popular, albeit retrospectively, bringing the Government to a humiliating defeat in the Lords in the summer of 1984, and enhancing Labour's performance in the borough elections of 1986. The Government decisively lost the battle for public opinion (Husband 1985). Abolition also put on to the opposition parties' agenda (both Labour and the Liberal-SDP Alliance) proposals for revenge executions of the Conservative bastions in the shire counties. The Conservatives embarked upon a high-risk initiative with little of the foresight normally associated with party political manoeuvres.

Unadulterated party ambition, which frequently rebounds against the instigator, is therefore the ever-present theme of London and Paris reorganizations of the last thirty years. These reorganizations confirm the unsurprising fact that party political interests, both perceived and misperceived, are paramount in local government reorganizations.

#### BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS?

However, it is not only party politicians who intrigue and play political games with electoral and administrative structures. Unelected public officials, in central and local administration, have stamped their mark upon reorganizations, especially at the implementation stage. Bureaucratic politics shapes reorganizations even if they are ultimately initiated by politicians.

A notable specimen of bureaucratic politics has been the organization of education in London. An administrative network crossing central and local government was decisive in lobbying for the establishment of the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) in 1964 which basically left the old LCC educational organization intact in inner London. The unintended consequence was to reduce and strengthen the proposed bottom tier boroughs of outer London, a significant development which left the GLC precarious from its inception, and undermined the declared managerial rationale behind the two-tier metropolitan system. The officials of suburban authorities were also instrumental in lobbying for the exclusion of parts of counties like Surrey from incorporation into Greater London. Their success unintentionally undermined the Conservatives' party-political rationale for abolishing the LCC since the narrowness of the GLC's boundaries immensely enhanced Labour's electoral prospects.

The abolition of the GLC also shows the marks of administrative politics. London Transport professionals seem to have been eager to be depoliticized. As the interviews carried out by the Greater London Group's research team showed, the Greater London Boroughs' staffs were generally eager to be free of formal GLC constraints over their planning and roads policies. Moreover, according to *The Economist* (16 March 1985) the arrival of abolition on the Government's agenda was partly the result of a bureaucratic game in central government. Abolition of the GLC was a 'sop' offered by the Department of the Environment to the Treasury which was, as ever, keen to gain control over local government expenditure. The carve-up of the GLC has also shown the central departmental interests at stake: ILEA survives intact once more, and with direct elections, and since the elections of 1986 with a majority of Labour councillors! Given Thatcher's notorious dislike of ILEA, its

survival testimony to the continued sway of Department of Education officials who have disliked organizational ruptures in education. (The fate of the Baker proposals to dismantle IIEA incrementally, first aired in the general election of 1987, will make interesting viewing.) Equally significantly, the Department of Transport is now free, after abolition, to do what it likes best – building roads – and it is showing every sign of wanting to do just that. Moreover, the post-abolition arrangements suggest that centralized and vertical functional organization of metropolitan government has triumphed over the Government's rhetoric about decentralizing former GIC functions to the boroughs. It can also be contended that the Whitehall penchant for policy, legal and financial centralization of the whole network of central-local relations has been facilitated by retrenchment: GIC abolition is simply part of a general centralization of the UK state. However, retrenchment was only an excuse for formal centralization. After all, the facts demonstrate that formal decentralization under the French Socialists proceeded despite retrenchment, and the French decentralization has even been cynically interpreted as strategy for shedding central state responsibilities.

The greater formal separation of central and local governments' bureaucracies accounts for the greater visibility of the impact of administrative politics on London reorganizations. Nonetheless Parisian reorganizations have also shown, albeit less overtly, the footprints of administrative politics. The *ad hoc District de la Région Parisienne* enabled Delouvrier and central administrators to achieve *de facto* what they had been denied *de jure* by political resistance to the Ordinance of 1959 and the Maspétiol proposals. The creation of more departments and prefectures during 1964–66 also had the impress of bureaucratic politics. Later, resistance to the idea of a mayor for Paris was intense within the Ministry of Interior and the prefectural corps, and eventually erupted in the sacking of a prefect. Chirac's mayoral victory was a double irony. As Minister of the Interior in Pompidou's last days, he had supported the ministry's opposition to any serious democratization of Paris, but when it became plain that Chirac would win the mayoralty, proposals for enhanced prefectural controls over Paris, favoured by central administrators, came back onto the agenda. The Paris police, like the London metropolitan police, have so far successfully resisted all reform proposals which would put them under a framework of local democratic accountability. In part this position of the police reflects past history, and the current dominance of the political right in both capitals, but it is also a testament to the influence of the police as a pressure group.

#### POLITICAL THEATRE?

Politics in liberal democracies is not simply about class, party or bureaucratic interests; it is also a theatre of tragedy and farce in which the vulgar and noble traits of the political class are daily displayed. More importantly, in liberal democratic political systems there is an in-built bias for elected politicians to display signs of activity and management. The citizens must be persuaded that politicians are working and that somebody is in charge of the show. Liberal democratic politics often requires politicians to engage in symbolic action, and reorganizations are

excellent vehicles for politicians aiming to improve their *curriculum vitae* (Edelman 1964; Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, chap. 3 and 4).

The Paris and London regions contain about a fifth of the electorate of France and the UK. It is therefore not surprising that party interests and contestation should be so fierce; nor that symbolic political acts be so frequently staged in the capital city. But the plays which have been staged over the reorganizations of the capitals of France and the UK during these last three decades provide ample support for those who like to emphasize the dramaturgical aspects of politics.

Paris has always been a theatre for French Presidents and politicians. France lacks Britain's 'banana monarchy' institutions so its Presidents have felt free to dabble in royalist mystique in their capitals. De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard and Mitterrand have all regarded Paris as somehow part of the President's reserved domain, constitutional niceties notwithstanding. That Westminster or Whitehall elites could take the same public interest in the architecture or urban planning of their capitals is inconceivable. Only Prince Charles has intervened in the architecture of the capital in ways comparable to a French President! De Gaulle used Presidential authority to order *Les Halles* out of the *Ville de Paris*. The drama of Gaullist master-planners colouring their maps in their offices symbolized the new France. Pompidou built the *Centre Beaubourg* – now renamed in his memory – in the heartland of revolutionary Paris, as theatrical a gesture of the bourgeois conquest of Paris as one could imagine. Giscard's 'environmentalism' was played before the audience of the capital a month after being elected in 1974. He blocked the Gaullist motorway plans for the Left Bank, and followed it up by scrapping plans for the *Les Halles* area. The 'decentralizer' was going to stamp his mark upon the capital before he gave it a mayor! Giscard's four open letters to Premier Chirac between 1974 and 1976 in which he defined his objectives and priorities for Paris and the Paris region (the first two), and for urban policy (the second two), were high drama. The symbolic project of preventing France from becoming uglier (*Verlaidissement de la France*) would only cause mirth if an equivalent play was put on before a British audience. But the play has its beneficial side effects for Paris, as London is widely agreed to be becoming even more ugly than Paris.

Paris and London by many current demographic and manufacturing economic indicators are both world cities in decline (Hall 1984), both in comparison to regional cities in their own countries, and in comparison with other world cities. However, the development of the Paris region has outstripped that of London and its environs, and is arguably now in the process of a boom, especially in the new high-technology industries. The symbolic significance of their capital to the French political class has materially aided the arrest of the comparative decline of Paris. But London is less likely to benefit in the same way. The symbolism of a voiceless London and the material desolation of the inner city has been of little concern to current Conservatives. Unless a significant tranche of the Livingstone administration become London MPs among a Labour governing majority in central government, it is unlikely that such symbolic and material neglect will alter rapidly.

London theatre has therefore had a different set of players and audience to that of Paris. For complex reasons the British political class has not been as concerned

with serious symbolic drama in its capital. A casual inspection of *Who's Who* confirms that the British political class does not live in London, and perhaps it therefore does not identify with London in the same way as its French counterpart identifies with its capital city. The idea of a Macmillan or a Wilson centre, perhaps mercifully, is almost unthinkable in British political culture! For Conservative élites it has traditionally been more important for them to display their ability to control the unruly and disruptive forces in the metropolis, to show that rural and suburban England have the capital under control. These propensities are dying however. The slow *embourgeoisement* of the inner city, as the residential area around the City expands, together with gentrification elsewhere, will create a Conservative constituency for improving the face of the capital. This process is well under way in the East End of London, and if it continues unabated inner London politics will eventually resemble those of Paris.

The two major London reorganizations have displayed distinct theatrical features, notably the characteristics of 'garbage can' decision-making (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). London's institutions have been the context (or garbage can) into which have poured problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. The GLC abolition is paradigmatic. Some of the Conservative government's problems between 1981 and 1983 were how to control public expenditure, how to satisfy the need to be seen to be doing something about the 'rates', and the need for items in an election manifesto under the banner of the 'resolute approach'. One solution always offered in Conservative discussions of local government and London was GLC abolition. The coupling of the problems and the solution was and is by no means obvious unless one looks at the world through the garbage can model. The top participants in the hierarchical central-local relations game were in search of symbolic promises for the next electoral game. Moreover, the abolition of the GLC does not simply have features of garbage can decision-making; it also looks like a policy folly: a policy pursued against the long-run self-interest of the policy-makers, a policy perceived as counter-productive by at least some of its makers at its inception, and a policy to which feasible alternatives were available.

Abolition was against the self-interest of the Conservative Cabinet because of the public opinion damage sustained; because of the high opportunity costs of the policy; because the GLC's organizational core remained largely intact before a general election; because abolition has made revenge local government reorganizations by the opposition parties likely; and because abolition cost the executioner (Patrick Jenkin) his political career. The policy was regarded as folly and counter-productive by Michael Heseltine and Tom King, Jenkin's predecessors at the Department of the Environment, who were not consulted over its inclusion in the 1983 manifesto. Other feasible choices were available: rate-capping and a determined campaign to oust the Livingstone administration through the ballot box would have solved Conservative policy problems much more effectively.

Mistakenly, the standard academic images of Thatcherism, Marxist and New Right, wholly discount personality and symbolic style, and play up the ideological or policy consistency of the Conservative leadership since 1979. However there is an irreducible dramatic and chaotic component to Thatcherite decision-making.

It is Nietzschean, intended to transform values. Rational, consensual and incremental policy-making is an excuse for doing nothing. Obstacles to a revitalized Great Britain must be removed. The GLC was considered one such obstacle. The abolition of the GLC is merely one example of the price paid for playing this theatrical style. In contrast to the pathos of the guillotining of Sydney Carton, the execution of the GLC has been a British farce for which the analytical tools of political science and political economy are ill-equipped.

## CONCLUSION

Generalizing from the reorganizations of two capital cities is subject to all the standard objections to inductive extrapolation. However, two standard modes of explaining reorganizations – administrative rationality and class conflict, on their own, or combined – do not account for all the evidence from the London and Paris cases. Managerialism and class struggle form part of the rhetorics of reorganizations, and indeed may provide good justifications for political élites, but they do not seem to be completely decisive factors or sufficiently finely graded modes of explanation. The evidence from London and Paris reorganizations confirms that political interventions are often autonomous of administrative or class logic. Reorganizations are not mere registers of the subterranean workings of socio-economic forces. However, the reorganizations show that these political interventions are not autonomous from the political system.

First, most of the cases of reorganization we have examined confirm the unsurprising proposition that reorganizations are one of the main ways in which politicians can exercise power, and their motives for reorganization, while being ideological, will almost always be most affected by how the coalition of interests which they manage will be affected by reorganization. (Needless to say their calculations frequently will be erroneous.) In these reorganizations it was the mode of reorganization rather than the decision to reorganize which was affected by bureaucratic interests and latent bureaux' ideologies. Politicians were definitely the initiators of reorganizations, rather than the marionettes of administrators. Second, in liberal democratic systems party competition is entrenched, and astute politicians will attempt to use state power to consolidate their party or movement and to undermine the social base of their opponents. These tendencies will be manifested most overtly in unitary political systems with plurality-rule election systems because they lack some of the incentives for consensual institution-building found in federal systems and/or proportional representation election systems. Third, in liberal democratic political systems, even politicians of *laissez-faire* persuasion are obliged to engage in symbolic action: they must be seen to be doing things which are apparently solving problems. Reorganizations are excellent symbolic activities which displace attention from insoluble public policy problems, or problems which politicians have neither the resources nor the desire to solve.

At a lower level of abstraction, Paris and London reorganizations demonstrate that there is some truth in Ashford's thesis of *British dogmatism* and *French pragmatism* – if one judges reorganizations on the basis of their outcomes (London's

organizational cycle versus Paris' cumulative move towards more effective local government). However, if one accepts this thesis the explanation should not be sought solely in the surprising discovery of British rationalism and French empiricism, but rather in the history of the party system of the two countries. Paris and London reorganizations are also testimonials to the significance of the dramaturgy of politics, politics as theatre. That is not surprising. What has been surprising is the role reversal: to the audience of the intelligentia British farce excels French drama. However, the marginal bureaucrats and the 'wretched of the cities', for whom service delivery is impaired or employment terminated, and who have suffered from reorganizations, appreciate neither the farce nor the drama. Reorganization for them is not much of a spectator sport.

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